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Abstract
The imposition of sanctions is one of the most common means of enforcing cooperation in
decentralized interactions. Typically, agents are asymmetric in the sense that each has a dif-
ferent sanctioning power. Using a public-good experiment we analyze such a decentralized
punishment institution in which agents are asymmetric. The asymmetric punishment institu-
tion prevents the decay of cooperation towards the non-cooperative equilibrium level. Strong
agents contribute less to the public good, but punish more than weak agents. At the aggre-
gate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric
punishment institutions.
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With topics such as nuclear proliferation and climate change hotly debated, discussions on how
to solve cooperation problems have returned to the center of attention. The two issues have
similarities. Firstly, negotiations between nations are, in essence, decentralized. That is, a central
authority to enforce law and order does not exist. Secondly, negative externalities are present in
both cases. Refusal to decrease the emission of greenhouse gasses is often believed to impose a
cost to the whole world by increasing, for example, the number of extreme weather phenomena.
Similarly, developing nuclear weapons increases insecurity to other nations and diminishes their
relative bargaining power. Generally, ￿when externalities are present, private self-interest and
overall group welfare may be at odds￿(Noussair and Tucker, 2005, p. 649) and we have a social
dilemma.
A common way of dealing with negative externalities is the imposition of sanctions (punish-
ments) on parties that deviate from a widely accepted norm of behavior. A recent example is the
announcement of the United States￿intention to impose ￿nancial and military sanctions to North
Korea for conducting its ￿rst nuclear test. One purpose of sanctions such as these is to lower
the return from acting against the social interest. This implies that the e¢ cacy of sanctions in
enforcing cooperation depends critically on the sanctioning power of the sanctioning party. The
greater the power of the party abiding to a given norm, the less appealing a deviation from that
norm will be for other parties.
The purpose of this paper is to study the e¢ cacy of decentralized sanctions in fostering coop-
eration when players are asymmetric in their sanctioning power and negative externalities exist.
To our knowledge this is the ￿rst study on the topic. We investigate two contradicting hypotheses
about the impact of asymmetric punishment institutions. On the one hand, Olson (1965) and
Axelrod (1997) propose that a ￿dominant power￿will have a positive e⁄ect on cooperation. A
justi￿cation for this hypothesis is that punishment of non-cooperators is a public good. All group
members bene￿t from the resulting increase of cooperation due to punishment, but all have an
incentive to let others carry out the punishment cost. By allocating punishment power to one
strong player, the free-rider problem at the punishment stage may be alleviated. On the other
hand, several contributions to oligopoly theory (discussed below) argue that cooperation between
asymmetric agents is less likely. The reason is that the strongest of the group faces less of a threat
of being punished when failing to cooperate. Therefore, the strong player is more likely to defect,
jeopardizing future cooperation of the whole group.
As a starting point for our analysis we use the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) - a
2game that economists have repeatedly used to analyze the tension between the social good and
self interest. In the VCM, individuals have to make a decision concerning how much they wish
to contribute to a public account. The higher the contributions to the public account, the higher
the group payo⁄. However, every individual has also an incentive to free-ride and not contribute.
The VCM captures, in a simple manner, the con￿ ict between social and self interest due to an
externality present in many situations such as the ones described in the ￿rst paragraph and, thus,
is suitable for the purpose of this paper.
To investigate the impact of asymmetric punishment institutions on cooperation, we study
treatments with asymmetric players (where players di⁄er in their ability to sanction each other) and
compare the results to treatments with symmetric players (where all players have equal sanctioning
ability). In particular, we investigate four asymmetric punishment institutions and compare them
to two symmetric institutions, controlling for the average sanctioning power.
The results indicate that asymmetric institutions can be very successful in fostering cooperation,
and are as e⁄ective and e¢ cient as symmetric institutions. Strong players contribute less to the
public account in comparison to their weak counterparts, but are more likely to punish free-riders.
Strong players have higher payo⁄s than weak players.
Our work builds on previous research that examines the symmetric enforcement of coopera-
tion in social dilemmas (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; 2002; Masclet et al.,
2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Sefton et al., 2005). The evidence indicates that, under cer-
tain conditions￿ such as the absence of retaliation opportunities (Denant-Boemont et al., 2005;
Nikiforakis, 2005) and the existence of an adequate punishment threat (Nikiforakis and Normann,
2005)￿ symmetric players can sustain cooperation through the use of decentralized punishment.
The present experiment examines asymmetric enforcement of cooperation. We believe the issue to
be of interest as, in most real-world scenarios, symmetric players are the exception rather than the
norm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
the procedures. Section 3 contains hypotheses for our treatments and Section 4 illustrates the
experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Experiment
The experiment is based on the design of Fehr and G￿chter (2002) and Noussair and Tucker (2005)
who use the voluntary contribution mechanism with n players. In every period, all participants
3are given an endowment y. Players then decide simultaneously and without communication how
much of the endowment to contribute to a public account, ci, where 0 ￿ ci ￿ y. The rest (y ￿ ci)
remains in the player￿ s own account. In addition to the money player i keeps, i receives a ￿xed
percentage of the group￿ s total contribution to the public account, ￿, where 0 < ￿ < 1 < n￿. This
implies that the payo⁄ of player i in the ￿rst stage of some period is
￿1




In the second stage, after the participants decide how much to contribute to the public account,
they are informed about how much the other individuals in their group contributed. They can then,
if they wish, purchase punishment points to reduce the income of one or more other participants.
Punishment is costly for the punisher as every point reduces his income by 1 ECU (experimen-
tal currency unit). Let pij denote the number of punishment points that player i assigns to j
(where i;j=1, ..., n; j 6= i), and ej the income reduction that one punishment point from player i
causes to its recipient, that is, j￿ s punishment e⁄ectiveness (we use this term interchangeably with
sanctioning power). Player i￿ s payo⁄ at the end of a period is accordingly
￿2










The maximum number of points a participant can distribute to others is equal to his payo⁄ from
the ￿rst stage, that is,
P
j6=i pij ￿ y ￿ ci + ￿
Pn
i=1 ci. As in stage one, punishment decisions are
made simultaneously and without communication. In all treatments, it is common knowledge that
y=20, n=4 and ￿=0.4.
Table 1 describes the treatments in the experiment. The treatment labels read ￿es_ew￿ , such
that the number on the left indicates the e⁄ectiveness of the strong player, es, and the number
on the right the e⁄ectiveness of the weak players, ew. So, for example, in treatment ￿5_1￿ , one
punishment point from the strong player reduces the income of its recipient by 5 ECU, while one
punishment point from the weak players reduces the income of its recipient by 1 ECU. In the
asymmetric treatments, there was always one ￿strong￿and three ￿weak￿players.
The treatments di⁄er in two dimensions: First, the asymmetry level indicates the relative
strength of the strong player￿ s punishment and is denoted by l ￿ es=ew: Second, the average
e⁄ectiveness, ￿ e, is the average punishment e⁄ectiveness of the group members, ￿ e ￿ (es + 3ew)=4.
We ran treatments with ￿ e = 2 and ￿ e = 3. Based on the ￿ndings of Nikiforakis and Normann
(2005) we anticipated that the higher the level of punishment e⁄ectiveness the higher the level
4of cooperation. For both ￿ e = 2 and ￿ e = 3; we conducted sessions with l = 3 in addition to the
symmetric control sessions with l = 1: We also ran a treatment with ￿ e = 2 and l = 5 (￿5_1￿ ).
However, we were concerned that a treatment where ￿ e = 3 and l = 5 (￿7.5_1.5￿ ) would be risking
losses for the weak players due to the magnitude of the strong players￿punishment e⁄ectiveness in
this case. This could have caused frustration and have led to erratic behavior. Consequently, we
decided to conduct treatment ￿4_2.6￿with ￿ e = 3 and l = 1:5:1
insert Table 1 about here
Information feedback is as follows. At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects are
informed whether they are assigned the role of a strong or a weak player.2 These roles remained
￿xed for the duration of the experiment. At the beginning of each period every player is randomly
given a number between 1 and 4 to distinguish their actions from those of the others in that
period. To prevent the formation of individual reputation, the numbers are randomly reallocated
in the beginning of every period. Participants are aware of this. Such a mechanism ensures that,
even though the group members remain the same, the participants cannot link the actions of the
other subjects across the periods. Once the participants have contributed at stage one, they are
informed about their group￿ s total contribution to the public account, individual contributions and
their payo⁄ from the period as given by equation (1). At the end of each period, participants are
informed about the punishment points they received, the associated income reduction and their
payo⁄ from the period as given by equation (2). Subjects are not informed about the individual
punishment decisions of the other players. They only know how many points they assigned to the
other group members, thus, retaliation as in Denant-Boemont et al. (2005) and Nikiforakis (2005)
is not possible.
All treatments last for 10 periods. For the experiment we use ￿xed (or ￿partners￿ ) matching.
This implies that every group can be regarded as a statistically independent observation. For treat-
ments ￿2_2￿ , ￿3_3￿and ￿5_1￿ we have six groups and, thus, six independent observations. For
1We did not use treatments with ￿ e = 1 instead of ￿ e = 3 as this would require ew < 1 in the asymmetric
treatments. If ew < 1 a punishment carried out by the weak players increases inequality between the victim and
the punisher. This would make comparison with treatments where ￿ e = 2 harder as in these cases punishment either
reduces inequality or leaves inequality una⁄ected.
2In the instructions, we used neutral language. The strong agents were ￿type A￿and the weak agents were ￿type
B￿. Punishment was termed as ￿points that reduce another player￿ s income￿. The instructions are available from
the authors upon request.
5treatments ￿4_1.3￿ , ￿4_2.6￿and ￿6_2￿we have ￿ve groups. In two cases, we missed the target
of six groups due to individuals not showing up. In the third case (￿4_1.3￿ ), we had to discard
one group from the analysis due to a bankruptcy problem.3
The experiments were conducted at the University of London (Royal Holloway College and Uni-
versity College). The total number of participants was 132 (not counting the discarded group).4
The subjects were recruited using an e-mail list of voluntary potential (student) candidates. Par-
ticipants were from a variety of backgrounds. None of the participants had participated previously
in a public-good experiment. Sessions lasted approximately ￿fty minutes. The rate of exchange
between the experimental currency unit and the British pound was 1 ECU = £0.04. The average
earning in the experiment was £10.61 or roughly $20. The experiments were conducted using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
3 Hypotheses
In this section, we propose informal conjectures about the e⁄ect of an asymmetric punishment
institution on cooperation. The only rigorous game-theoretic prediction is the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium punishments and, therefore, asymmetries do not matter. The
reason is that our experiment is ￿nitely repeated and, by backward induction, the prediction for
all periods of all treatments is that players do not punish and do not contribute to the public good.
On the other hand, we know from previous research that institutions allowing for decentralized
sanctions can increase cooperation levels (e.g. Fehr and G￿chter, 2000; 2002; Masclet et al., 2003;
Noussair and Tucker, 2005). Asymmetries may also matter and we wish to suggest some conjectures
about their impact.
Olson (1965) and Axelrod (1997) argue that the presence of a strong player is likely to improve
cooperation. The reason is that the punishments at the second stage of the game (aimed at
improving cooperation) are a public good itself. Accordingly, free riding by not punishing is the
short-run payo⁄-maximizing behavior. Let us compare treatments with symmetric punishment
3The group had one subject contributing nothing for several periods and the other three subjects, who contributed
the maximum amount, punished her harshly, causing the bankruptcy of the subject in period 5. In order for the
experiment to continue we credited her account with £ 5. Whereas we did continue collecting data beyond that
period, we decided not to include the group in the data analysis. In the ￿rst ￿ve periods, punishment in this group
was six times higher than the treatment average which would cause a severe bias if we included this group in our
statistical analysis. Moreover, a post-experimental questionnaire indicated that the behavior of the punished person
was due to a misunderstanding.
4The observations for symmetric treatments ￿2_2￿and ￿3_3￿are taken from Nikiforakis and Normann (2005).
6e⁄ectiveness to asymmetric treatments. Making one player more e⁄ective in punishing and the
other three players less e⁄ective might help overcome the free-rider problem at the second stage.
The strong player￿ s punishment is important to enforce cooperation as the weak players might
be unable to enforce cooperation by themselves. Knowing this the strong player is more likely to
punish. Therefore, punishment at the second stage is more likely to occur and thus cooperation at
the ￿rst stage will improve.
Conjecture 1: An asymmetric punishment institution leads to higher contribution levels compared
to a symmetric institution.
Some contributions to oligopoly theory suggest just the opposite, that asymmetries are an
obstacle to cooperation. Davidson and Deneckere (1984, 1990), Lambson (1995) and Compte et al.
(2002) show that introducing asymmetries in the cost parameters or the capacities of oligopolistic
￿rms typically reduces the scope for successful collusion. The intuition is that making one ￿rm
bigger or more e¢ cient implies that this ￿rm faces a smaller punishment following a deviation from
cooperation. Hence, the big ￿rm is less likely to cooperate and, in turn, the industry is generally
less likely to cooperate. Similarly, the strong players in our game are the most di¢ cult to discipline.
Therefore, controlling for ￿ e, the group as a whole will ￿nd cooperation more di¢ cult compared to
the symmetric setup.
Conjecture 2: An asymmetric punishment institution leads to lower contribution levels compared
to a symmetric institution.
Obviously, the two conjectures are mutually exclusive. However, it should be apparent why the
two above arguments lead to opposite conclusions. The argument that a strong player can help
overcome the free-rider problem at the punishment stage is based on the presumption that the
strong player is inclined to enforce cooperation. The reasoning based on the reduced threat the
strong player faces assumes, by contrast, that the strong player is a sel￿sh player in the sense that
she will not contribute to the public good￿ unless forced to do so by punishment. The contrasting
conjectures suggest that the e⁄ects of an asymmetric punishment institution depend on the prefer-
ences of the strong player. A strong player inclined to support cooperation in the group may have
the punishment power to do so, even if the weak players are initially zero contributors. But the
opposite might not be possible. If the strong player has no inclination to establish cooperation,
the weak players may not have the punishment power to change the strong player￿ s behavior even
if they want to.
7That cooperation levels depend on the preferences of the players involved has been proposed by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, section IV). Their argument is based on the existence of ￿conditionally
cooperative enforcers￿who may be able to force sel￿sh players into contributing. As for the impact
of asymmetries, if chance assigns the role of the strong player to a conditionally cooperative en-
forcer, the group should cooperate better than in the symmetric treatment. If the strong player is
sel￿sh, the opposite should occur. However, whether enforcement of cooperation is more e⁄ective
in an asymmetric punishment institution than in a symmetric institution remains an open ques-
tion. The answer to this question depends on intricate details (average punishment e⁄ectiveness,
distribution of punishment e⁄ectiveness, frequency of the conditionally cooperative enforcers) and
neither institution generally dominates the other.
Conjecture 3: Whether or not an asymmetric punishment institution improves cooperation de-
pends on the preferences of the strong player.
4 Results
We begin the analysis by taking an overview of the data. We then proceed with a rigorous analysis
of the impact of the asymmetric punishment institution on contributions to the public account,
the punishment behavior, and on welfare.
4.1 Overview
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our results. The table reports average contributions,
average income before and after the punishment stage, and details of the punishment stage. The
￿rst thing to note is that in all treatments the punishment institution can sustain cooperation at
higher levels than the ones predicted by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The asymmetric
institutions appear to be as e⁄ective and e¢ cient as the symmetric institution on the aggregate
level. Strong players tend to spend more money on punishment than weak players.5 Treatments
with ￿ e = 3 appear to have higher contributions to the public good than treatments with ￿ e = 2.
insert Table 2 about here
5In treatment ￿4_2.6￿the average number of punishment points assigned by weak agents is slightly higher than
of that of the strong agents. This is the product of a single group in which the weak agents punished severely.
84.2 Contributions to the public account
The impact of average e⁄ectiveness (￿ e) and asymmetry level (l) on contribution rates can be seen
more clearly in Figure 1. Contributions in treatments with ￿ e = 3 are at a high level and, overall,
appear to be increasing over time. On the other hand, contributions in treatments with ￿ e = 2 are
at a lower level and remain more or less constant or even decline slightly after period ￿ve. The
striking fact is that the evolution of contributions is very similar amongst the three treatments
with ￿ e = 2 (the lower three lines) and also amongst the three treatments with ￿ e = 3 (the upper
three lines).
insert Figure 1 about here
We now turn to the statistical analysis of the data. The data is a panel as we have repeated
observations from the same individuals. Decisions are likely to be strongly correlated within
groups. As a result, we include random e⁄ects at the group level. As implied by Figure 1, there
is a concentration of data at 20 ECU (recall that 20 is the maximum contribution). This implies
that we have to use a Tobit model for restricted dependent variables. The independent variables
are three, a dummy variable which takes the value of one for all treatments with ￿ e = 3 and zero
otherwise; asymmetry_level which is l ￿ es=ew
6; and strong, a dummy variable which takes the
value of one when individual i is a strong type in an asymmetric treatment and zero otherwise.7
insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 shows the results of a Tobit regression investigating the e⁄ect of the explanatory vari-
ables on contributions. As implied by Figure 1, the level of asymmetry does not have a signi￿cant
impact on contributions, while as average e⁄ectiveness increases from 2 to 3 so do contributions on
6We ran various similar regressions where asymmetry (or di⁄erent levels of asymmetry) was captured by a dummy
variable. The results turned out to be similar.
7We ran alternative regressions in which the strong dummy is equal to one for strong players in the asymmetric
treatments and for all players in the symmetric treatments. Results from these regressions did not di⁄er qualitatively
from the ones reported here.
9average. The main result from Table 3 is that strong players contribute signi￿cantly less than weak
players. Adding a time-trend variable in these regressions does not change the results qualitatively.8
Result 1: Asymmetric punishment institutions are as successful as symmetric institutions in
fostering cooperation.
Result 2: The average e⁄ectiveness of punishment has a signi￿cant impact on contributions.
Result 3: Strong players contribute less to the public good than weak players.
4.3 Punishment behavior
Next, we analyze punishment behavior. The most interesting question is whether strong players
punish di⁄erently than weak players. According to Olson (1965) and Axelrod (1997), strong
players should be punishing more. Figure 2 gives a ￿rst answer about whether this is the case in
the experiment. On the horizontal axis we plot the deviation of individual j0s contribution from
that of his peers. On the vertical axis we plot the likelihood of j being punished by strong and
weak players. For all levels of deviation, strong players are found to be more likely to punish. The
di⁄erence exceeds 20 percent in some cases.
insert Figure 2 about here
For a regression analysis we need to take into consideration that, of the 3960 possible punish-
ment cases (132 participants times 3 targets per period times 10 periods), punishment was observed
in only 613 cases. This implies that the modal behavior in the second stage is to avoid punishing.
The appropriate econometric speci￿cation to capture the two-stage process is a hurdle-model. The
hurdle-model is a parametric generalization of the Tobit model in which the decision to punish
and the extent of punishment are determined by two separate stochastic processes.9 The hurdle is
crossed if an individual decides to punish.
The likelihood function for the hurdle model is given by the product of two separate likelihoods.
First, the likelihood that a subject punished another group member or not, which is captured by
8Non-parametric tests yield similar results for the e⁄ect of ￿ e and l to the ones reported in this section. However,
to study the impact of strong players we need to use parametric tests to isolate the e⁄ect of increasing ￿ e and l.
9For an example of using hurdle-models to analyze decision in public good games see Botelho et al. (2005).
10a Probit model, and second, the conditional likelihood that an individual punished with a certain
number of points, which is captured by a truncated at zero Tobit model. The two parts of the
hurdle-model are estimated separately (McDowell, 2003).
Table 4 presents the estimates of the hurdle-model. The dependent variable in the punishment
decision is a dummy taking the value of one if subject i punished subject j and zero otherwise.
The dependent variable in the punishment-level decision is the number of points that i assigned to
j. Figure 2 indicates that punishment might be increasing in the negative deviation of j from his
peers. Moreover the reaction seems to be di⁄erent if j contributed more or less than his peers, with
much more of a reaction to negative deviations. To capture this e⁄ect, in addition to our treatment
regressors, we include separate positive [negative] deviation of j which measure how much more
[less] j contributed in comparison to the average of the other three group members in period t. We
also add period to capture the time trend as punishments appear to decline over time.
insert Table 4 about here
The results from the regression lend support to the observations made when looking at Figure
2. Strong players are more likely to punish than their weak counterparts. This is surprising, given
that strong players were found to contribute less to the public account. We will return to this issue
later in section 4.5. In any event, the tendency of strong players to punish more frequently might
explain why, even though strong players contribute less to the public good, they still do not cause
the breakdown of cooperation.
In Table 4 we also see that, given a subject decides to sanction another group member, strong
and weak players assign the same number of points. This is surprising because, in order to achieve
the same level of income reduction of the punish player, weak players need to assign more points
than strong players. We conjecture that weak players generally rely on the strong players to enforce
cooperation. They are less likely to punish in the ￿rst place and, if they punish, the punishment
points they assign may well be insu¢ cient to foster cooperation without the punishments from the
strong players.
Result 4: Strong players are more likely to punish than weak players. Given a player decides to
punish, the strong and weak players assign similar number of points.
11As one would expect, group members contributing more than the average of their peers are
signi￿cantly less likely to be punished. On the other hand, group members contributing less than
the average of their peers are more likely to be punished. In addition, the less they contribute
compared to their peers the higher their punishment is. The likelihood of a punishment diminishes
over time, but not the punishment intensity.
An interesting ￿nding is that, given participants decided to punish, the level of asymmetry
lowers signi￿cantly the number of points assigned to an individual. This suggests that the asym-
metry helps solve the coordination problem that exists in the punishment stage. In the symmetric
treatments individuals observing a free-rider are uncertain whether others will punish her. As a
result, more than one group member might punish a defector. In the presence of asymmetries
the focal player is the strong player, and the strong player can achieve the income reduction more
e¢ ciently. The strong player knows that he has a comparative advantage in punishing and that
his weak counter-parts also know this.
Result 5: The higher the level of asymmetry the lower the punishment points assigned.
Result 5 might be good news for social welfare. If the existence of a focal player reduces
punishment points, then the group saves on punishment costs. However, for welfare to bene￿t
from the existence of asymmetries, this e⁄ect must outweigh the fact that the punishment carried
out by the strong players is more damaging than that of the weak players. This is what we study
next.
4.4 Welfare
As mentioned above, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts that there will be no punish-
ments and no contributions in the experiment. From equation (2), this implies a period payo⁄ of
20 ECU per person. On the other hand, if each member contributes the whole endowment to the
public account and abstains from punishments each individual will have a payo⁄of 32 ECU. These
are the benchmarks against which we measure the performance of the asymmetric punishment
institution.
Table 2 illustrates how payo⁄s are shaped in each of the six treatments. As indicated by equation
(1), the higher contributions are (column 2) the higher the average income before punishment will
be (column 3). Column 7 reports the average income that was lost due to punishment activities
and includes the cost to both the punisher and the target. The average payo⁄ (column 8) is found
by subtracting column 7 from column 3.
12Figure 3 complements Table 2 by illustrating the evolution of average payo⁄s for each of the
treatments separately. The following become apparent. First, payo⁄s are somewhere between the
Pareto optimal payo⁄ of 32 ECU and the one predicted by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of 20 ECU. Second, there appear to be no signi￿cant di⁄erences between treatments. This implies
that the positive e⁄ect of asymmetries discussed above is o⁄set by the heavier use of punishment
by the strong players.
insert Figure 3 about here
In columns 9 and 10 of Table 2 we also ￿nd the average income of strong and weak players. We
see that with the exception of treatment ￿4_1.3￿strong players tend to have a higher income. A
comparison of columns 5 and 6 indicates the greater expenditure on punishment by strong players
indicated earlier.
Table 5 presents the results of a random-e⁄ects regression where the dependent variable is
the payo⁄ of individual i at the end of a period, ￿2
i: We ￿nd that neither the level of average
e⁄ectiveness nor the level of asymmetry have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on welfare. However, we also ￿nd
that strong players have higher payo⁄s than weak players. Average payo⁄s increase over time due
to increasing contributions (in treatments with ￿ e = 3) and falling expenditure on punishment (in
all treatments).
Result 6: Group welfare is not a⁄ected by average e⁄ectiveness or the level of asymmetry.
Result 7: Strong players have signi￿cantly higher payo⁄s than weak players.
insert Table 5 about here
4.5 Discussion
We saw in Result 1 that cooperation levels do not di⁄er signi￿cantly between asymmetric and
symmetric punishment institutions. Hence, this rejects both Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 2. Nei-
ther do we observe improved cooperation rates nor do we see the breakdown of cooperation with
13the asymmetric institution. Result 1 is consistent with Conjecture 3, saying that the e⁄ect of
asymmetries should depend on the attitude of the strong player in the group. If ￿cooperative￿and
￿non-cooperative￿strong players are balanced in the population, the e⁄ect of asymmetries might
cancel out￿ which is just what we seem to observe.
However, underlying Conjecture 3 was the notion that players are either (conditionally) co-
operative enforcers who both contribute and punish, or sel￿sh players who do neither. This is
inconsistent with the results that strong players, on average, contribute less and punish more. If
we make a clear distinction between ￿cooperative￿and ￿non-cooperative￿types of players, players
(including the strong ones) should either contribute and punish if they are cooperative, or not
contribute and refrain from punishing if they are non-cooperative. What players should not do,
according to this view, is reduce cooperation at the contribution stage but then punish in order to
encourage contributions by others.
Nevertheless, contributing less and punishing more is the modal behavior of the strong players.
Table 6 categorizes strong players according to whether they contribute more or less than their
peers￿average and whether they punished more or less than their peers on average.10 Out of 21
strong players, there are 4 players who contribute more and punish more, and there are also 4
players who contribute less and punish less. They are consistent with the categorization of purely
￿cooperative￿and ￿non-cooperative￿types of players. But the majority of players, 10, contribute
less and punish more. In the opposite category, contribute more and punish less, only one player can
be found. The remaining two subjects are exactly equal to the average in at least one dimension.
We conduct two simple non-parametric tests regarding the data in Table 6. First, the hypothesis
that the behavior of the strong players does not di⁄er from that of the weak players is rejected. If
strong and weak players behaved alike, the entries in Table 6 should be equally distributed across
the four cells. However, a (one sample) chi-square test indicates signi￿cant di⁄erences (￿2 = 9:00,
d:f:=3, p=0:029). Second, if we had mainly ￿cooperative￿players who contribute and punish more,
and ￿non-cooperative￿players who contribute and punish less, the upper left and the lower right
cell should be the two modes. If so, there should be signi￿cant di⁄erences between the proportions
of Table 6. This is, however, not the case as the p-value for the same or a stronger association of
Fisher￿ s exact test is p = 0:603.
insert Table 6 about here
10We measure punishment behavior here by the points given to other players, that is, the income the players
sacri￿ced.
14The behavioral mode we observe is surprising as lower than average contributions will discour-
age other players from cooperation while harsher punishments will encourage cooperation. One
interpretation is that, understanding their comparative advantage in punishing, strong players sim-
ply ￿save￿in the ￿rst stage to contribute to the second-order public good, that is, the punishment
of free-riders. In that sense, there are two public goods and players seem to treat the two public
goods as substitutes. Apparently, strong players shirk (at least partially) at the contribution level
but contribute more at punishing. The strong players might ￿justify￿the lower contributions to
the public good because they are more active at contributing at the punishment stage. Of course,
they can do so only because they do not face much of a threat from weak players. An interesting
extension would, therefore, be to see what happens when there are two strong players. Given that
the strong players do not cooperate perfectly at both levels, the pattern we observe is e¢ cient.
The strong players have a comparative advantage in punishing and, in a way, this is what they
￿specialize￿in.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present the results from an experiment investigating the e¢ cacy of an asymmetric
punishment institution in enforcing cooperation in the presence of externalities. We ￿nd that the
asymmetric enforcement of cooperation is as e⁄ective at sustaining cooperation and as e¢ cient as
the symmetric institutions at the aggregate level. Asymmetries neither foster cooperation nor do
they constitute an obstacle to it. At the individual level, strong players bene￿t from the asymmetry.
They contribute less to the public account and punish more than their weak counterparts. This
results to higher payo⁄s for the strong players.
Our experiment is motivated by the imposition of real sanctions by players asymmetric in
their sanctioning power. What can our results, therefore, say about decentralized enforcement of
cooperation by asymmetric players? Keeping in mind that one needs to be careful generalizing
from experiments where, similar to theoretical models, a number of forces present in the real
world have been isolated, a number of points can be made. First, it seems that the existence
of asymmetries might limit the punishment expenditure by improving coordination. While this
e⁄ect alone improves welfare, the higher damage in￿ icted by the sanctions of strong players can
reduce welfare. Second, weak players might not be able to force a non-cooperative strong player
to cooperate and, therefore, the need arises to control the strong player. Our data indicates that
strong players might be willing to enforce cooperation knowing that they also bene￿t from it.
15Whether the strong players in our experiments had truly cooperative preferences or whether they
adopted the role of the enforcing ￿policeman￿(realizing that cooperation depended on them) is a
question to be answered in future research. Third, the payo⁄ di⁄erence between strong and weak
players could indicate that, given the option, weak players will have an incentive to invest a part
of their endowment in enhancing their punishment e⁄ectiveness, and such incentives may give rise
to an ￿arms race￿for punishment e⁄ectiveness.
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"2_2" 2  2  2  1  24 
"4_1.3" 2  4  1.3  3  20 
"5_1" 2  5  1  5  24 
"3_3" 3  3  3  1  24 
"4_2.6" 3  4  2.6  1.5  20 
"6_2" 3  6  2  3  20 
1 “Average Effectiveness is the average punishment effectiveness of the group members, i.e. (es + 3ew)/4. 
2 “Effectiveness” refers to the income reduction in ECU caused to the recipient by a single punishment point.  
3 “Asymmetry Level” is defined as es / ew. 
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(7) 
Average 
Payoff   
 















"2_2"  11.83 27.10 1.07 -  -  3.20  23.90  -  - 
"4_1.3" 12.36  27.42  1.01  1.12 0.97 3.08  24.34  23.24  24.69 
"5_1"  12.49  27.49  0.47  0.55 0.44 1.49  26.00  28.40  25.20 
"3_3"  15.87 29.52 0.84 -  -  3.37  26.15  -  - 
"4_2.6" 15.92  29.55  0.68  0.60 0.70 2.64  26.91  27.85  26.56 
"6_2"  15.17  29.10  0.91  1.40 0.74 4.12  24.99  26.17  24.59 
* “Average Income Lost” is the sum of the average punishment cost paid by the punishers and the average income reduction suffered by 
punishment recipients. 







Dependent variable:  
contribution ( i c ) 
Constant  11.520*** 
(0.680) 
Asymmetry Level  0.194 
(0.201) 
Strong Player (dummy) -1.369** 
(0.587) 
Three (dummy)  3.144*** 
(0.560) 
  N = 1320 
Wald χ
2 = 38.02** 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 
10% level,** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Regression is a 
random effects (at group level) Tobit.  
 
Table 3 — Determinants of Contributions  









on being punished) 




























  N = 3960 
Wald χ
2 = 546.54***
N = 613 
Wald χ
2 = 66.85*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level,** at the 
5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Punishment Decision regression is a random effects 
(at group level) Probit.  Punishment-Level Decision regression is a random effects (at a 




Table 4 — Determinants of Punishment 
 
  
Independent variables  Dependent variable: profit (
2
i π ) 
Constant  23.966*** 
(1.702) 
Asymmetry Level  0.200 
(0.482) 
Strong Player (dummy)  1.247*** 
(0.422) 
Three (dummy)  1.499 
(1.420) 
  N = 1320 
Wald χ
2 = 10.03** 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level,** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Regression is a random 
effects (at group level) linear regression.  
 
Table 5 — Determinants of Welfare  
   Punish 
   More    Less 
More   4  1  Contribute  Less   10  4 
Note: The total number of strong players is 21. The actions of two strong players are 
equal to the average of the weak players in at least one dimension. 
 
Table 6 — Categorization of strong players according to whether they 
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Figure 2: Punishment likelihood as a function of deviation from the 








































Figure 3: Evolution of Payoffs 
 
 